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Kurdish Sufi Spaces of Rural-Urban.
Connection in Northern Syria
Paulo Pinto
1 THE  KURDS  ARE the  largest  ethnic  group  in  Syria  after  the  Arabs,  constituting
approximately 8% of  the total  population1,  which means a  community of 1,2  to  1,5
million people [van Dam 1996; McDowall 2000; Courbage 2007; Pinto 2007; Tejel Gorgas
2009].  There  are  three  regions  in  northern  Syria  where  the  Kurds  constitute  the
majority of the population: the Kurd Dagh (Mountain of the Kurds) and the plain of
’Afrin2,  which  comprise  an  area  between  Aleppo  and  the  Turkish  border;  the  area
around ’Ayn al-’Arab; and the region along the border with Turkey between Ras al-’Ayn
and Qamishli in the northeastern part of the Jazira. There are also significant Kurdish
communities in Damascus and Aleppo [McDowall 2000].
2 Kurdish ethnic identities in Syria are articulated into various forms of group affiliation,
such as “tribe”, “locality” or “class”, depending on the social context in which they are
produced  and  expressed.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  shared  sense  of  belonging  to  a
broader Kurdish community defined as a cultural community with a common history,
which articulates the various social and cultural realities of the Kurds in Syria. The
collective  emphasis  on  the  maintenance  and  public  expression  of  certain  cultural
diacritics, such as the use of Kurdish language, aims to mark the ethnic boundary3 that
defines Kurdish identities in relation to other ethnic groups in Syria.
3 The Kurdish population of both ’Ayn al-’Arab and the Jazira is mainly rural. However,
the  intensification  of  the  rural  exodus  in  the  last  two  decades  has  swollen  the
population of regional urban centers such as Qamishli and Hasake. As tribal identity
remains an important source of social insertion among the Kurds of the Jazira, the ties
of  tribal  affiliation  are  reproduced  in  the  patterns  of  urban  settlement  and  tribal
hierarchies are translated into political power and social prestige [Darwish 1996].
4 The Kurd Dagh, which is a region that extends north of Aleppo until the Syrian-Turkish
border, has its economic and administrative center in the town of ’Afrin4. It became
fully integrated into the economic sphere of Aleppo due to its geographical position. Its
main economic activities are olive harvesting and olive oil production, both of which
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have their products traded in Aleppo’s markets. Tribal identities are quite weak in the
Kurd  Dagh  and  have  not  played  any  relevant  role  in  the  local  social  or  political
organization since the French Mandate [Lescot 1988]. Most men go to Aleppo to work as
manual laborers throughout the year, returning regularly to their villages during the
weekends  and  for  the  harvest  season  of  the  olives.  Due  to  this  continuous  flux  of
people, the Kurdish community of Aleppo and the Kurd Dagh are united not only by
economic ties, but also by cultural habits and social imaginaries.
5 With  more  than  2  million  inhabitants  Aleppo  is  Syria’s  second  largest  city  after
Damascus. Aleppo’s role as the center of Syria’s private industrial enterprises makes it
the main urban center for the Kurdish-majority regions in northern Syria attracting a
large influx of migrants, which created a populous Kurdish community connected to its
rural origins. The size of Aleppo’s Kurdish population is hard to evaluate, as it does not
appear in the official statistics and is affected by both cultural arabization of the new
generations born in the city and the influx of rural migrants, probably ranging between
300,000 and 600,000 of its inhabitants.
6 The  center  of  Kurdish  cultural  and  social  life  in  Aleppo  is  the  neighborhood  of
’Ashrafiyya,  which is  located  northeast  of  the  city  center.  Kurds  of  different  social
strata live there and Kurdish music and conversations in Kurmanji set the rhythm of
social life. Despite its mixed social setting, the ’Ashrafiyya is perceived by most middle
class Kurds as a desirable neighborhood to live, for it has good urban services and a
dynamic commercial section within a Kurdish cultural environment. To the northwest
of the ’Ashrafiyya there is a string of Kurdish neighborhoods, such as Sheikh Maqsud
and Sha’r, which were settled mostly by poor rural migrants without close connections
in Aleppo.
7 As  one  goes  west  these  neighborhoods  become  poorer  and  ethnically  mixed,
withKurdish  migrants  from  the  Jazira  settling  among  Arab  migrants  from  the
Euphrates region or the rural areas west of Aleppo. Migrants from the Kurd Dagh tend
to  have  family  members,  friends  or  connections  with  religious  networks  already
established in Aleppo what allows them to settle in better neighborhoods. South of the
’Ashrafiyya and not connected to it, there is the neighborhood of Hamdaniyya, which is
looked after by more affluent professional middle-class Kurds for its location and better
urban services.
8 Even though most Kurds in Aleppo usually belong to the lower strata of society, since
many of them are recently urbanized rural migrants employed in unskilled or manual
labor,  there  is  a  significant  Kurdish middle-class  of  professionals,  businessmen and
members of the state bureaucracy, which invests heavily in education as an asset for
social  mobility  [Bottcher  1998;  McDowall  2000].  Cultural  arabization  becomes  more
conspicuous as one moves upwards socially. However, even more privileged Kurds tend
to live in neighborhoods with a large Kurdish population, showing the persistence and
importance of ethnic identity and solidarity beyond individual social mobility.
9 The vast majority of the Kurds in Syria are Sunni Muslims. The Islamic practices and
beliefs among the Kurds are marked by a strong influence of Sufism, the mystical trend
in Islam. Historically,  Sufism was codified into discrete ritual and textual traditions
that are usually called “orders” or “mystical paths” (tariqa), which are acquired and
transmitted by its religious leaders: the sheikhs. The main tariqas among the Kurds are
the Qadiriyya and the Naqshbandiyya. Nevertheless, in the Kurd Dagh and the Kurdish
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community of Aleppo, the Rifa’iyya also has a strong presence. The Sufi communities
are organized in ritual centers or lodges called zawiyas.
10 The Sufi zawiyas usually accompany the migration of their members, creating branches
in Aleppo or,  simply relocating the whole community there.  These zawiyas serve as
cultural references to the new migrants, creating spaces of solidarity and channels for
their integration into the urban universe. At the same time, the connection with the
rural world is maintained through the continuous allegiance to the sheikhs who lead
zawiyas located in their village of origin, or through pilgrimages to the holy sites (tombs
of saints or prophets) in the countryside.
11 In order to show how discrete articulations between rural  and urban universes are
created and lived in the Sufi zawiyas, I will analyze two Kurdish Sufi communities that
have their religious universe linked to both Aleppo and ’Afrin. The data analyzed here
was collected during the ethnographic research that  I  have been doing among Sufi
communities  in  northern  Syria  since  1999.5 This  research  included  participant
observation in the communities analyzed here with participation in their religious and
non-religious  activities,  as  well  as  interviews  and  informal  conversations  with  the
sheikhs and their followers in various settings inside and outside the zawiyas.
12 First  I  will  expose the importance of  Sufism among the Kurds in Syria.  Then I  will
analyze Sheikh Mahmud al-Husayni’s zawiya in ’Afrin and its role in the local social
dynamics and as a  space of  establishment of  symbolic  and economic relations with
Aleppo.  After that I  will  analyze Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s  zawiya in Aleppo as a space
where  the  relations  between  Aleppo  and  its  rural  hinterland  are  continuously
negotiated and renewed with the incorporation of rural migrants into the urban life,
and the insertion of urban Kurds into rural religious and social networks. Finally I will
conclude highlighting the main issues that emerged from the analysis  of  these two
zawiyas.
 
Kurdish Sufism in Northern Syria
13 Sufi communities are spread throughout the rural areas of the northern Syria, such as
the Kurd Dagh, as well as among the large Kurdish population of Syria’s main urban
centers, such as Aleppo.6 It has been stated by some scholars that the tariqa (Sufi order/
mystical path) Naqshbandiyya is dominant in Kurdish-majority areas, and that the only
other to have had a significant presence is the tariqa Qadiriyya [van Bruinessen 1992
and 2000; McDowall 2000]. However, the religious landscape of northern Syria offers a
more complex picture of Kurdish Sufism, for other tariqas, in particular the Rifa’iyya,
have  an important  presence  in  the  Kurd Dagh,  in  the  Jazira  as  well  as  in  Aleppo.7
Furthermore, the new Sufi communities that developed in the last decade among the
Kurdish population of Aleppo tend to be less closely identified with any specific tariqa.
These new zawiyas are better defined by the charismatic figure of their sheikh, as it is
not uncommon for the sheikh to claim affiliation to two or more tariqas in order to
legitimize the particular mystical path embodied in his religious persona.
14 While many Kurdish zawiyas in Aleppo are simple urban extensions of rural zawiyas,
they must  be  analyzed within  the  context  of  Aleppine Sufism.  Aleppo has  been an
important center of Sufism in the Arab world since the 13th century [Geoffroy 1995]. In
the 19th century some Sufi traditions of Aleppo, such as the Qadiriyya and the Rifa’iyya,
passed through a process of hierarchical organization under the authority of Sheikh Al-
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masha’ikh.8 The remnants of this centralized and hierarchical organization, which still
remain  in  place  for  the  Qadiriyya,  constitute  the  core  of  the  traditional  Sufi
establishment of Aleppo.
15 The limited capacity of  the traditional  Sufi  structures of  Aleppo to incorporate the
Kurdish migrants, despite the fact that many religiously observant Kurds are attached
to Sufi forms of piety, concurred to create a social and religious context favorable to
the emergence of new Sufi zawiyas in the Kurdish neighborhoods.9 These zawiyas can be
classified as: a) new urban Sufi communities created around local charismatic sheikhs;
b) the extension of rural zawiyas created by sheikhs who followed the migration of their
followers, or sent their deputies (khalifas) to Aleppo in order to create urban zawiyas
subordinated to their own; c) branches of Sufi networks centered around one sheikh
who has both hierarchical and horizontal connections with other sheikhs over a vast
territory.  While  the  first  kind  of  zawiya may  foster  the  creation  of  an  “Aleppine”
Kurdish Sufism, the other two connect Aleppo with the Kurdish areas of northern Syria,
adding a religious dimension to the multiple links that exist between these areas.
16 These different types of Sufi organization should not be seen as static structures, but
rather as possible configurations in an ongoing process of production and reproduction
of Sufi communities. So, if a sheikh has khalifas (deputies) in different locations, his
religious authority may acquire a translocal dimension. Later on, his khalifas may create
new zawiyas and he may become the central link in a Sufi network. On the other hand, if
a network becomes too large it may not be possible to control all  the subordinated
sheikhs, who may break up from it, creating smaller networks. Similarly, if the main
sheikh dies or loses his power, the Sufi  network may fragment into unrelated local
communities.  These local  communities  may remain as  such,  start  new independent
processes of expansion, or, eventually, disappear.
17 In rural areas the Sufi  sheikhs tend to have their authority fully recognized by the
community where they reside, and affiliation to their zawiyas is usually inherited as
part of family tradition. However, but in the villages and urban centers of the Kurdish-
majority areas of northern Syria there is a plurality of competing sheikhs who try to
gather followers across  tribal  or  class  divisions,  and affiliation to their  zawiyas is  a
matter  of  personal  choice.  Some  sheikhs  manage  to  become  religious  leaders  in  a
regional or even transnational scale, as the Naqshbandi Sheikh Ahmad Khaznawi of Tall
Ma’ruf who had followers throughout the Jazira and the Turkish Kurdistan. His Sufi
networks of followers and disciples were inherited by his sons and grandsons, including
the  late  Sheikh  Muhammad  Mash’uk  Khaznawi,  who  became  a  symbol  of  Kurdish
resistance to the Ba’thist political order.10
18 The most important center of Qadiriyya in the Kurdish regions of northern Syria was
’Amuda,  where  no  less  than  30  Qadiri  sheikhs  had  their  zawiyas in  the  1930s  [van
Bruinessen  1992].  While  the  number  of  sheikhs  in  ’Amuda  was  much  reduced
throughout the years,  it  still  is  an important religious center for the Qadiriyya and
attracts  pilgrims  and  visitors  from  all  northern  Syria.  Another  important  religious
center is  ’Afrin,  where is  the zawiya of  Sheikh Hassan al-Naqshbandi,  the sheikh al-
masha’ikh of the Naqshbandiyya in the Kurd Dagh.
19 An important feature of Sufism in the northern Syria is the cult of saints organized
around the tombs of dead sheikhs or prophetic figures that dot the countryside. The
cult of saints allows the fusion between religious, cultural and territorial identities. In
the  areas  of  high  density  of  Kurdish  population  the  saints’  tombs  give  an  Islamic
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identity  to  the  landscape,  constructing  a  “sacred  geography”  of  the  territory  by
connecting Islamic practices and beliefs with natural or social landmarks, as well as
integrating into the realm of Islam the remnants of pre-Islamic sacred landscapes. The
tombs of saints are located in rural cemeteries, on hilltops, near water springs, or even
in pre-Islamic ruins or holy sites. The best example of the Sufi appropriation of pre-
Islamic sites is Nabi Huri in the Kurd Dagh, which consists of a lavishly built Roman
tomb  dating  from  the  2nd  century  a.d.,  which  has  been  venerated  since  the  14th
century as the burial place of one of the prophetic predecessors of Muhammad.11 
20 The cult of saints anchors Islam into familiar places where one can seek the help and
the blessing of holy figures that have the power of mediating between local ordinary
life  and  the  universal  abstract  doctrines  and  practices  sanctioned  by  the  Islamic
tradition [Gonnella 1995].  This is done among the Kurds by claiming that prophetic
figures or major leaders of Sufism, such as ’Abd al-Qadir Jeilani, were ethnic Kurds. By
embodying abstract doctrines into concrete and accessible figures and places the cult of
saints also allows the local communities to incorporate the Islamic tradition into the
dynamics of their power relations [Pinto 2004].
21 Finally, the mawlids (saint feasts) that are celebrated at the tombs of the saints are the
occasion  for  large  pilgrimages  and  tomb-visitations  (ziyarat),  attracting  individual
devotees  or  entire  Sufi  communities  from  all  over  northern  Syria.  These  Sufi
pilgrimages produce a sacred territory, which is delimited by the various paths that
link  distant  communities  to  the  saint’s  tomb.  The  celebration  of  collective  rituals
during the mawlids also creates forms of solidarity and identification that reach beyond
the  local  community,  producing  a  broader  framework  to  religious  identities.  The
territorial basis of these supra-local religious communities can be re-signified as the
political basis of religious versions of Kurdish nationalism.12 However, it is important to
have  in  mind  that  the  ethnic  and  national  identities  that  were  developped  in  the
Kurdish Sufi communities in Syria vary according to the larger social context in which
they are inserted.
 
Creating a Rural Elite: Sheikh Mahmud al-Husayni’s 
Zawiya in the Kurd Dagh
22 The zawiya of Sheikh Mahmud al-Husayni is the major Rifa’i community in the region of
’Afrin, which recruits its members among the town inhabitants and the villagers from
the surrounding rural areas.13 The community had around 200 members, of whom 20
were disciples initiated in the mystical path by Sheikh Mahmud.14 The religious prestige
of Sheikh Mahmud attracted followers among the migrants to Aleppo or Damascus, or
their descendants who maintained the ties with his zawiya as part of their identities as
Kurds  from  ’Afrin.  Sheikh  Mahmud’s  followers  were  all  Kurds,  mainly  peasants,
agricultural  workers  or  shopkeepers  from  ’Afrin.  Sheikh  Mahmud  himself  had  an
orchard from where he harvested olives to make olive oil,  which he sold in Aleppo.
Nevertheless,  the  charismatic  nature  of  his  religious  authority  also  attracted  state
employees and school-teachers.
23 Sheikh Mahmud’s land was not much larger than the average property size in the area,
but his economic situation was better off than that of his disciples as well as of the
majority of the inhabitants of ’Afrin. This was the result of the large amount of gifts
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and  services  that  he  received  from  his  followers  and  disciples  (murids).  It  was  not
uncommon for  Sheikh  Mahmud  to  receive  gifts  in  goods  –  such  as  clothes,  food,
agricultural tools, etc. – from the merchants of ’Afrin as a retribution for the favors,
such as the cure of illnesses or good luck in business, which they believe that were
delivered by his baraka (divine grace).
24 He also received donations from his murids, from whom he also expected to receive free
services (khidma) such as working on his land or in the maintenance of his zawiya. To
serve  one’s  sheikh  is  considered  to  be  part  of  the  mystical  initiation  in  the  Sufi
tradition,  and  nobody  in  Sheikh  Mahmud’s  zawiya thought  about  these  activities  –
which fell somewhere between voluntary and compulsory work – as a form of economic
exploitation. These services were rather seen as gifts in return for the baraka received
from the sheikh. Besides that, Sheikh Mahmud expected a percentage of the income of
his followers, which was justified as a form of zakat (tithe) and was sometimes imposed
even to peasants who were not affiliated to his zawiya.
25 These economic resources in money and material goods were partially redistributed
among his followers according to the logic of charity, privileging those perceived as in
being in a state of social vulnerability, such as the unemployed, widows, sick people,
etc. The constant flow of money and goods from the sheikh diluted the possible social
tensions existing around him. It also created public support for his image as generous
(karim) and detached from material  riches,  which was put forward by his  followers
despite the obvious accumulation of goods and capital  that resulted from his social
position as a Sufi sheikh.
26 Sheikh  Mahmud  legitimized  his  religious  authority  through  his  baraka,  which  was
attributed by his followers to his claimed genealogical descent from Ali, as well as by a
chain of transmission of mystical knowledge (silsila) that included Ahmad al-Rifa’i. He
said that his family descended from Sheikh Salim, a grandson of Ahmad al-Rifa’i who
introduced the tariqa Rifa’iyya among the Kurds.15
27 Interestingly these claims had a more profane, but equally prestigious, counterpart in
the  “bureaucratic  genealogy”  expressed  by  the  official  documents  dating  from  the
Ottoman era and the French Mandate, which recognized the sheikh of this zawiya as the
head  of  the  Rifa’iyya  for  the  whole  region.  These  documents,  which  were  proudly
displayed on the walls of the zawiya, revealed a tradition of mediation between the local
community and the state that was continued with Sheikh Mahmud.
28 The main mechanism of production and display of identities and collective solidarity in
the Sufi community led by Sheikh Mahmud was the weekly hadra (ritual gathering) that
took place in his zawiya. The central element of the hadra was the ritual of the dhikr
(divine evocation), during which the sheikh displayed publicly his baraka through the
performance of karamat (miraculous deeds) by him or his disciples. Among these there
are the darb al-shish (body piercing with skewers), such as piercing the abdomen with a
sword (darb al-saiyf),  walking over burning coals, or eating glass. All these deeds are
considered by the members of this zawiya as miracles (karamat) produced by Sheikh
Mahmud’s baraka.
29 By enduring these ordeals, the disciple advances in the hierarchy of the tariqa (Sufi
order/mystical path), at the same time that he presents public and material evidences
of  the  mystical  power  of  the  sheikh.  Beyond  that  the  dhikr in  this  zawiya aims  to
produce mystical experiences in its participants which are evaluated according to the
models of the Sufi tradition as it is defined and transmitted by Sheikh Mahmud. This
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experiential framework is a powerful mechanism of embodiment of the Sufi tradition
as a constitutive part of the religious selves of the members of this zawiya.
30 The Sufi identities produced at Sheikh Mahmud’s zawiya are marked by a strong ethnic
framework, which defines Sufism as a form of “Kurdish Islam”. For example, when I
asked about his zawiya, Sheikh Mahmud answered:
The most important thing is that we are Kurds.
31 These words were followed by statements which I often heard in Kurdish zawiyas:
We Kurds have the true Sufism. ’Abd al-Qadir Jeilani was a Kurd. Sufism does not
exist among the Arabs.
32 These statements were received with signs of approval by the rest of the members of
the  zawiya,  who  proudly  confirmed  that  their  religious  identities  as  Sufis  were
necessarily  linked  to  their  Kurdish  ethnic  identity.  This  discourse  also  affirms  the
power of the Sufi sheikhs as local authorities in the rural areas of northern Syria in
detriment of the Syrian state.
33 The self-image of this Sufi community shows how claims to religious distinction – in
this case the purity of their mystical tradition – allow the definition of Kurdish ethnic
boundaries in opposition to the religious practices and identities of the Muslim Arabs.
The claim “’Abd al-Qadir Jeilani was a Kurd” pushed further the religious character
attributed to Kurdish identity, for it made the Kurds not only the holders of the Sufi
tradition, but also those who transformed it into a major force in Islam. The logical
consequence of this affirmation is that if the Arabs received the divine revelation the
Kurds were the ones who kept its soul alive. Therefore, a religious distinction between
Kurds and Arabs was established despite the fact that both are Sunni Muslims in their
majority.
34 The definition of the Kurds as the holders of “true” Sufism also reverses in moral terms
the material and cultural hierarchies that concur to create the subordination of the
Kurds in the Syrian political and social order. Therefore, the moral community and the
religious identity created in Sheikh Mahmud’s zawiya allows its members to negotiate a
privileged insertion in the various social contexts present in the symbolic, political and
economic pathways that connect the Kurd Dagh to Aleppo passing through ’Afrin.
35 The religious construction of Kurdish ethnic identity in Sheikh Mahmud’s zawiya finds
echo  in  the  political  and  social  role  of  the  Sufi  sheikhs  as  mediators  of  conflicts.
Therefore,  the Sufi  sheikhs are the responsible for maintaining the local  social  and
moral  order  and  establishing  limits  to  the  capacity  of  the  state  in  arbitrarily
intervening  in  the  local  community.  These  activities  make  the  Sufi  sheikhs  to  be
perceived by many people as the defenders of Kurdish cultural and social autonomy
and, therefore, as Kurdish leaders in a non-Kurdish state.
36 Sheikh  Mahmud’s  political  role  as  mediator  between  the  Syrian  state  and  his
community  allowed him to  formulate  a  discourse  that  re-signifies  his  political  and
religious power within the framework of Kurdish religious nationalism. For example,
once he told me in his zawiya:
Here [’Afrin] is Kurdistan. This is not the [Syrian] government’s land. It belongs to
the Kurdish nation. Here the only law (haqq) is our law, not the way of the Arabs,
but our customs and our respect to the shari’a.
37 This speech shows how the normative framework of cultural values, which are linked
to ethnic identities,  can be fused with the moral system of the “true Islam”, as the
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Kurds consider to be their Sufi traditions, in the process of construction of Kurdish
religious nationalism.
38 Sheikh Mahmud often led his followers in processions across the village, during which
his disciples carried the banners of the zawiya and of the tariqa Rifa’iyya, while some of
them performed the darab shish and other karamat, displaying publicly the power of the
sheikh’s baraka.  These performances impose a symbolic and physical  control of  the
public space by the members of the zawiya creating among the other villagers a mixture
of  fear  and respect  towards  Sheikh Mahmud and his  followers.  The  articulation  of
religious and ethnic discourses in Sheikh Mahmud’s rhetoric of religious nationalism is
coupled with the establishment of hierarchical social relations between his religious
community and the rest of members of the local society, be they Kurds or not.
39 In a certain measure, the political horizon of this hierarchical construction of religious
nationalism is the traditional pattern of Kurdish leadership, which aimed local political
and cultural autonomy in order to maintain its leadership based on links of patronage
and clientele. Therefore, while Sheikh Mahmud fiercely defended Kurdish religious and
cultural distinction, he aimed at the establishment of favorable relations with the web
of political and bureaucratic clientele that structures the capillarization of the Ba’thist
regime into the local instances of power [Perthes 1995].
40 Sheikh Mahmud sees his social authority as resulting from the embodiment of religious
virtues, such as moral superiority and baraka, in both his religious persona and his
community. These embodied virtues are publicly expressed as the capacity that Sheikh
Mahmud and his disciples have to perform various miraculous deeds (karamat).  The
idea  of  religious  distinctiveness  is  part  of  the self-image  constructed  by  the  Sufi
tradition, which claims that the Sufis constitute the khassat-al-din (religious elite) in
relation to the other Muslims. The transposition of the Sufi concept of khassat-al-din
into  the  realm of  social  organization allowed Sheikh Mahmud and his  followers  to
create  and  legitimize  social  hierarchies  based  on  their  capacity  of  performing
embodied  religious  virtues.  Thus,  the  process  of  “imagining  Kurdistan”  in  Sheikh
Mahmud’s zawiya is informed by the intellectual and practical adaptation of concepts
and power relations taken from the Sufi tradition into the realm of social relations.
41 The group solidarity that is created among the members of Sheikh Mahmud’s zawiya
through the rituals and their shared identity as some sort of “religious elite” allows
them  to  function  as  a  corporate  group  for  the  acquisition  of  social  and  economic
capital.  Sheikh Mahmud himself  accumulates  wealth through the donations of  cash
and/or olives  that  he  receives  from his  followers  and disciples.  Beyond that,  those
among the members of his zawiya who have olive tree orchards usually commercialize
their  harvest  of  olives  or  production of  olive  oil  through the  commercial  channels
organized by the zawiya.
42 Besides their own production, the members of the zawiya use the social status granted
by their religious skills in order to regularly extract zakat (tithe) from peasants who are
not affiliated to the zawiya. One peasant told me that when he was harvesting olives in
his property a group of Sheikh Mahmud’s murids came and, in his words:
One of them grabbed the skin of my neck and the other pierced it with the shish
(skewer) while saying “bismillah” (in the name of God). I was very scared and I gave
them half of the olives that I had harvested.
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43 This accumulation of marketable goods in the name of the religious community allows
even the members  of  the zawiya who have no rural  properties  to  benefit  from the
economic connections that it organizes between ’Afrin and Aleppo.
44 The olive oil is pressed in the mills of the peasant cooperative and, then, taken to the
zawiya.  Both  the  olives  and  the  olive  oil  are  taken  to  Aleppo,  where  a  network  of
merchants and middlemen who are originally from ’Afrin or its rural hinterland do
their commercialization in the city’s markets. These merchants and middlemen are all
connected to the zawiya, being disciples and followers of Sheikh Mahmud and paying
periodic visits to him in order to get blessings and participating in the mystical rituals
of the zawiya. In Aleppo, they were organized around Husayn, Sheikh Mahmud’s elder
son.16 He distributed the olives and the olive oil among the traders; gathered the profits
that came from the marketing of these commodities; calculated and distributed their
shares in the profits; and sent the zawiya’s share to Sheikh Mahmud, who would take his
part and distribute the rest among his followers.
45 Thus, we can see how Sheikh Mahmud’s zawiya provided its members with symbolic
and economic  forms of  capital  [Bourdieu  1997]  which  allowed them to  negotiate  a
privileged social insertion in both rural and urban contexts. In ’Afrin the followers of
Sheikh Mahmud have established themselves as a group with distinctive symbolic and
political positions in the local society. The economic networks that spring from the
zawiya into Aleppo also allowed the members of the zawiya to have an insertion in the
markets  of  the  regional  metropolis  without  having  to  necessarily  go  through  the
experience of migration to the city.
 
Pathways into the City: Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s Zawiya in
Aleppo
46 Sheikh Muhiy al-Din leads a Qadiri zawiya in the mixed Arab and Kurdish neighborhood
of Sheikh Maqsud in Aleppo. While his zawiya is not a mere extension of a rural Sufi
community, it functions as part of a larger Sufi network that has its center in the zawiya
of Sheikh Hassan al-Naqshbandi, the sheikh al-masha’ikh of the Naqshbandiyya in the
Kurd Dagh.  Sheikh Muhiy al-Din is  a  former murid (disciple)  of  Sheikh Hassan and,
while he was also initiated in the Qadiriyya tradition, which became the main mystical
reference of his community, he continues to see Sheikh Hassan as his spiritual master.
47 The connections between the Sufi communities led by Sheikh Muhiy al-Din and Sheikh
Hassan exist not only in the symbolical level, as disciples, money and ideas circulate
between them. Often Sheikh Muhiy al-Din sent his disciples to Sheikh Hassan’s zawiya
in ’Afrin for them to get baraka and religious knowledge from the old Sufi master.17
This flux of disciples allows the establishment of personal ties between the members of
the two zawiyas.
48 The organized movement of  disciples to Sheikh Hassan’s zawiya in order to acquire
religious knowledge and blessings is accompanied by another flux of members of this
zawiya towards Aleppo, which is triggered by the quest for better jobs and economic
opportunities in the city. The dislocation of the members of Sheikh Hassan’s zawiya to
Aleppo is more fragmented and uneven than the one in the other direction and do not
have Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya as an explicit  destination.  Nevertheless,  many of
them  end  up  becoming  members  of  this  religious  community  as  they  had  already
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personal relations with Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s disciples and see his religious authority
as legitimated by Sheikh Hassan.
49 The religious community of Sheikh Muhiy al-Din had around 300 members. The great
majority  of  them  were  Kurds,  while  there  were  some  Arab  residents  of  the
neighborhood  who  became  members  of  the  zawiya.  Sheikh  Muhiy  al-Din  had  25
disciples, all Kurds. The members of the zawiya were mainly unskilled workers, who had
menial jobs in construction sites or in the commercial establishments of the suq al-
medina,  Aleppo’s  main  bazaar.  The  charismatic  leadership  of  Sheikh  Muhiy  al-Din
attracted also some merchants and, even, professionals, such as lawyers and university
professors.  Therefore,  Sheikh  Muhiy  al-Din  led  a  community  with  a  small,  but
significant degree of social and ethnic mixity.
50 As in Sheikh Mahmud’s zawiya, the main instance of production of collective identity
and group solidarity is the public ritual session known as hadra. Its main ritual is the
dhikr, which has a similar structure to the one performed in Sheikh Mahmud’s zawiya.
The dhikr consists of the singing of songs praising the Prophet, as well as describing
God’s love and mercy. Some songs are chanted only by the sheikh’s disciples,  while
others are chanted by all participants, who also perform specific body movements for
each song, such as rocking the body back and forth or turning it from the right to the
left.
51 The dhikr dramatizes several features of Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s community. First of all it
consecrates through the ritual performance the power of the sheikh as the center and
source of order and identity. It also reinforces the hierarchical separation between the
sheikh’s disciples and his followers, as the former ones are those who interpret the
sheikh’s gestures and transform them into songs, movements and rhythm, and, thus,
become the leaders of the ritual performance. Finally it allows the participants in the
ritual  to  construct  and  communicate  an  individualized  religious  self  within  the
hierarchical symbolic order of the Sufi community.
52 The ritual performance of the dhikr also communicates cultural elements that refer to
the construction of Kurdish identities and their correlated ethnic boundaries in the
urban context of Aleppo. The main cultural diacritic that allows the configuration of
Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya as a religious community with a clear Kurdish character is
the use of Kurmanji18, Turkey in the songs chanted during the ritual. Almost all songs
that deal with God’s love and mercy are sang in Kurmanji, while most songs related to
the Prophet and his family are sang in Arabic.
53 This ritual allocation of the linguistic registry allows an interesting configuration of
Kurdish identity in the Aleppine context. The cultural hierarchies dominant in Aleppo –
which put classical Arabic on the top of the civilization scale and Kurmanji at its bottom,
often  together  with  other  “ethnic”  languages  or  local  dialects  –  are  symbolically
reversed in the religious hierarchy, as Kurmanji is associated with God and Arabic with
his  envoys.  However,  if  Kurmanji deals  with  the  individualized  experience  of  the
sublime presence  of  God or  his  esoteric  truth,  the  ritual  performance  reminds  the
audience that Arabic is necessary to deal with the humane dimension of his power, in a
metaphoric  reference  to  the  religious  and  political elites  that  does  not  escape  the
participants of the ritual.
54 In Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya Arabic is an important contrastive cultural element
used for the definition of the ethnic boundaries of Kurdish identity. However, it is also
presented to his disciples and followers as a linguistic capital whose acquisition and
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mastering  is  fundamental  for  a  successful  individual  and  social  trajectory.  While
Kurmanji is the preferred linguistic context for informal or individualized interactions
in the zawiya, the dars (lesson) proffered by Sheikh Muhiy al-Din after the dhikr is done
in colloquial Arabic, in the Aleppine dialect.
55 Also,  the  khutba (sermon)  that  he  delivers  before  the  Friday  prayers  is  done  in  a
mixture of classical and colloquial Arabic. Therefore, the Kurdish rural migrants find in
Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya a  cultural configuration that allows them to negotiate
their  ethnic identity in the cultural  environment of  Aleppo,  while dealing with the
dominance  of  Arabic  language  and Arab  cultural  identities  in  the  institutional  and
public instances of urban life.
56 Beyond the symbolic mediation between a Kurdish rural cultural environment and the
predominantly  Arab multicultural  universe  of  Aleppo,  Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s  zawiya
works  as  a  space  of  intense  socialization  and  networking  between  the  rural
“newcomers” and those who are already inserted in the urban economic and social
contexts. After the hadra and the dars almost all participants stay in the zawiya chatting
over  the  coffee  and  tea  that  are  prepared  and served  by the  disciples.  This  is  the
occasion  of  the  integration  of  the  newcomers  into  one  of  the  networks  that  are
organized around the members of the community who are better-off economically. As
many rural newcomers had ties with Sheikh Hassan in ’Afrin, they usually arrive in
Sheikh  Muhiy  al-Din’s  zawiya through  one  of  the  disciples  of  the  latter  who  they
eventually met in the zawiya of the former sheikh. Usually this first contact introduces
the  newcomer  to  one  of  the  networks,  where  others  can  help  him  find  a  job  in
commerce or construction.
57 These networks reinforce the importance of the affiliation to the Sufi community, as it
becomes the source of  possible pathways into Aleppo’s  economic and social  life  for
Kurdish rural migrants. Furthermore, beyond the economic benefits that can be tackled
through membership in Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya, the performative enactment of
piety and religious devotion that he requires from his followers constitute a valuable
symbolic  asset  in  a  city  such  as  Aleppo,  where  Islamic  religiosity  is  an  important
element of its urban identity [Pinto 2008-2009].
58 The ideal of Muslim piety associated to membership to Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya
provides its members with a cultural and linguistic capital that the rural migrants can
use to negotiate their insertion into various social arenas of Aleppo. An example of this
was the trajectory of Lukman, who migrated to Aleppo in 1997, when he was 19 years
old, coming from a village on the outskirts of ’Azaz, near the border between Syria and
Turkey. After spending a year going through underpaid temporary jobs, he started to
come to Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya brought by a fellow worker who he befriended in
one of his jobs.
59 Lukman was  always  very  religious  and very soon he became a  devoted follower  of
Sheikh Muhiy al-Din. His enhanced religiosity allowed him to create new friendships
among the other members of the zawiya.  One of them, after knowing the hardships
through which Lukman, who was unemployed at the time (2000), was going, decided to
introduce him to his boss in a factory that made traditional Aleppine silk scarves. The
owner  of  this  factory,  located  near  Bab  al-Hadid  in  the  Old  City,  belonged  to  a
traditional Aleppine family of merchants. He was a member of a Qadiri Sufi zawiya in
the Old City and I knew him from there, where I also did fieldwork. He affirmed his Sufi
identity  through  overt  Islamic  religiosity  in  the  public  space  and  insisted  that  all
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employees in his  factory,  who were twelve at  that  time,  were pious Muslims.  They
prayed  together  at  the  appropriate  times,  and  their  conversations  and  linguistic
interactions were punctuated with Quranic references and religious expressions.
60 Lukman’s  connection  to  a  Sufi  zawiya together  with  his  apparent  religiosity  were
important assets in his acceptance by the new boss and in little time he was seen as
part of the small “community” that fused work relations with moral imperatives and
personal relations in the factory. In this factory the wages were seen by both the owner
and employees as the share that everyone must pay to the wellbeing of the community,
with  the  former  insisting  that  they  should  not  be  defined  by  greed  and the  latter
insisting  that  they  should  assure  a  decent  living  to  the  workers.  The  religious
references given by Lukman’s socialization in Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya provided
him with a cultural language that allowed him to negotiate his relation with his boss
and his insertion in the factory in terms of mutual belonging to a moral community
rather  than  in  terms  of  unequal  positions  and  opposed  interests  in  the  economic
universe of the factory.19 With his stability in the job and situation in Aleppo apparently
assured, Lukman started to think about getting married with a girl from his village,
which he did two years later.
61 Notwithstanding the importance of Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya in the socialization of
Kurdish  rural  migrants  into  the  cultural  and  economic  universe  of  Aleppo,  the
mediation that it creates between the urban and the rural worlds in northern Syria
works both ways. While this Sufi community allows Kurdish rural migrants to integrate
into various spheres of the Aleppine urban life, it also provides the occasions to fully
urban or urbanized Kurds to create or renew their personal connections to the Kurdish
rural hinterland of Aleppo.
62 Every year, during the period of the Mawlid al-Nabawi (Birthday of the Prophet) there is
a pilgrimage of a group of Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s disciples to Sheikh Hassan’s zawiya in
’Afrin, as the latter is seen as his master in the esoteric knowledge of Sufism. Usually
the  group consists  of  five  to  ten  disciples  and  they  stay  around a  week  in  Sheikh
Hassan’s zawiya, where they are lodged. During this period they are treated as disciples
of Sheikh Hassan, following the dars (lesson) that he delivers to his own disciples and
taking part in the spiritual exercises that are part of the mystical education (tarbiyya) in
this zawiya. They also take part in the services of maintenance and the public rituals of
the zawiya.
63 As Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s disciples are mostly urban Kurds, born and raised in Aleppo,
this is an occasion for them to get in contact with a rural or semi-rural universe that is
constructed in the Kurdish nationalist discourse as the center of Kurdish life in Syria.
While some of them have family connections in the countryside, many do not have or
do not maintain contact with their rural relatives. In contrast, Sheikh Hassan’s disciples
are almost all rural Kurds who, while living in ’Afrin or in its outskirts, do work as
peasants or small agricultural entrepreneurs.
64 As the activities in the zawiya become more intense during the religious feasts,  the
degree of interaction between the pilgrims from Aleppo and Sheikh Hassan’s disciples
is very high during the period of their stay. During this time, the cultural differences
between the Aleppine Kurds and their counterparts in ’Afrin are often acknowledged,
expressed and evaluated according to the perception of Sheikh Hassan’s disciples, who
are in the dominant position of holders of a “higher” esoteric teaching and “truer”
Kurds than those exposed to the Arab culture of Aleppo.
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65 Thus, those among the pilgrims who speak broken or arabized Kurmanji are constantly
teased and corrected in their speech. The local form of Kurmanji is presented by Sheikh
Hassan’s disciples as the “correct” way of speaking. Those who eventually use Arabic to
express themselves receive remarks full of contempt and, even, hostility. The process
of  linguistic  improvement  in  the  local  form  of  Kurmanji goes  together  with  the
acquisition of Sheikh Hassan’s esoteric knowledge, as all his dars are delivered within
that linguistic framework, with Arabic being used only for citations from the Qur’an.
66 Therefore, while Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya emphasizes the acquisition of Arabic as a
cultural  tool  for  insertion  of  rural  Kurds  in  the  urban  universe  in  Aleppo,  the
experience  of  his  disciples  in  Sheikh  Hassan’s  zawiya stresses  the  importance  of
mastering Kurmanji to the full  participation in the mainly rural Kurdish universe of
northern Syria. The frequent interactions of the pilgrims with Sheikh Hassan’s disciples
in the religious and profane activities of the zawiya favors the establishment of personal
relations among them.
67 The personal relations with Sheikh Hassan’s disciples that were created during Sheikh
Muhiy  al-Din’s  disciples  stay  in  their  zawiya was  reinforced  by  the  shared  esoteric
knowledge  that  they  received  from  the  sheikh’s  teachings,  which  made  them  see
themselves  as  participants  into  the  same  moral  community.  Sometimes  these
religiously-based personal relations developed into more mundane partnerships.
68 For example, when I was accompanying the pilgrims to Sheikh Hassan’s zawiya in 2002,
two of  Sheikh Muhiy  al-Din’s  disciples  had  established a  partnership  with  some of
Sheikh Hassan’s disciples.20 The latter bought olives directly from the peasants during
harvest time and transformed them into olive oil using various private and collective
presses in ’Afrin. Then, the two ones, who were small merchants in Aleppo, owning
shops in the poorest section of the ’Ashrafiyya, would transport the olive oil and sell it
to other merchants in the city. This partnership generated good profit to both parts, as
it allowed them to avoid both the state cooperatives and private middlemen. Part of the
profit was donated to their respective sheikhs as zakat (tithe), emphasizing the moral
basis of their economic enterprise.
69 For what interests us in this article, this Sufi-based partnership created channels for
the economic insertion of the Aleppine merchants of Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya in
the rural  universe of  olive harvesting and olive oil  production,  in tandem with the
economic insertion of the rural entrepreneurs of Sheikh Hassan’s zawiya into the urban
markets  of  Aleppo.  In  this  sense,  the  economic  frontiers  between  urban  and  rural
markets,  which  are  usually  controlled  by  state  institutions,  such  as  the  peasant
cooperatives, or private middlemen, usually connected to state officials, were bypassed
through the establishment of religiously based personal relations between the agents
involved in the trade.
70 The connections between Aleppo and the Kurdish regions of its rural hinterland that
are  created  through the  religious  and ethnic  networks  which  spring  from the  Sufi
zawiyas that  frame  the  Kurdish  religious  life  in  northern  Syria  are  not  limited  to
economic ties. The pilgrimages and visitations (ziyara) to saintly or prophetic tombs in
the countryside also produce symbolic and emotional attachments to these rural areas,
which are re-signified as not only an ethnic territory but also a sacred land.
71 Every  year  many  zawiyas from  allover  northern  Syria  make  pilgrimages  and  they
celebrate the mawlid at the tomb of Nabi Huri, who is seen as a Kurdish prophet who
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lived in the time of the Old Testament. The disciples of both Sheikh Muhiy al-Din and
Sheikh Hassan performed this pilgrimage. Besides this pan-Kurdish pilgrimage, during
their stay in Sheikh Hassan’s zawiya the disciples of Sheikh Muhiy al-Din perform the
visitation to the tomb of Sheikh Hassan’s grandfather, who was also a sheikh and is
considered to be a saint, in the village of Kafar Jinna.
72 One of Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s disciples explained to me the importance of paying the
respects to the saintly sheikh during the visitation in which I took part in 2006:
To visit Sheikh Ahmad [Sheikh Hassan’s grandfather] is very important to us.  It
brings us close to the baraka (divine grace) that springs from our sheikhs and is
present in this land. This land is blessed and we are the keepers of its holiness
through Sufism (tassauwwf),  which is the madhab (ritual-legal religious school) of
the Kurds. Here we see how the power of our sheikhs is connected to this land,
which is ours [as Kurds].
73 In this speech we can see how the territory delimited by the saintly and prophetic
tombs is constructed as a sacred land that grounds and empowers the combination of
Islamic and Kurdish identities that are lived by Sufi Kurds even in urban settings as
Aleppo.
74 These  pilgrimages  and  tomb  visitations  produce  a  sacred  geography  that  connects
Kurdish  identity  with  a  certain  territory  delimited  by  holy  places  shaped  by  Sufi
religious imagination. In this sense, the religious circuit created by Sheikh Muhiy al-
Din’s zawiya connects Sufi and Kurdish identities as they are lived in Aleppo with a
rural territory in northern Syria that is defined as “holy” in the religious discourse of
Sufism as “Kurdish Islam” that is enacted in the holy sites that dot this territory.
 
Blurring the Boundaries: Sufi Zawiyas as Spaces of
Mediation of the Rural-Urban Divide
75 Both  Sheikh  Mahmud’s  and  Sheikh  Muhiy  al-Din’s  zawiyas produce  and  articulate
various levels of connection, as well as various instances of mediation, between the
urban context  of  Aleppo and the rural  universe of  ’Afrin.  This  shows how the Sufi
communities and the networks that spring from them have a fundamental role in the
integration of the discrete social and cultural universes of the Kurds in northern Syria,
in particular in Aleppo and its rural hinterland.
76 Sheikh Mahmud’s zawiya provides its members with a kind of religious and economic
capital that allows them to occupy a privileged place in the political and social life of
’Afrin. Through the zawiya Sheikh Mahmud’s disciples and followers can benefit from
economic and cultural links to Aleppo without having to go through the experience of
migrating to the city. In this sense, urban and rural cultural and social dynamics are
condensed  in  the  religious  life  of  the  Sufi  community,  which  becomes  a  space  of
mediation between these universes.
77 Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s zawiya also connects Aleppo with its rural hinterland albeit in a
very different way. The key elements here are mobility and the acquisition of cultural
capital. While rural migrants are socialized on the cultural universe and integrated in
the economic networks in the zawiya, urban or urbanized disciples are sent to acquire
religious knowledge as well as develop personal and emotional attachments to the rural
areas that are seen as an ethnic homeland by the Kurdish secular nationalist discourse
and as a sacred territory by the Kurdish Sufi discourse.
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78 Beyond the variation in the way that these Sufi zawiyas create connections and mediate
the cultural  and social  differences between Aleppo and its Kurdish hinterland, they
help to  blur  and dissolve the boundaries  between urban and rural  life  in  northern
Syria. The possibility of maintaining symbolic and practical connections to the rural
world also makes migration to the city, at least in northern Syria, to be a continuous
process of circulation of people, goods and ideas rather than a definitive rupture with a
previous social and cultural universe.
79 Therefore, the analysis of how urban and rural connections were played within Sufi
communities in Aleppo and in ’Afrin shows us that the urban and rural social universes
in northern Syria cannot be treated as fully separated. They should be rather seen as
connected through social networks and processes of cultural hybridization created by
the  continuous  circulation  of  people,  ideas,  goods,  patterns  of  consumption  and
lifestyles.
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NOTES
1. The population of Syria reached 17,980,000 inhabitants in 2004 [Courbage 2007].
2. The Arabic words are written according to a simplified version of the transliteration
system of IJMES.
3. Cultural diacritics are cultural elements objectified as markers of ethnic boundaries
between discrete social groups. See F. Barth [1998]. 
4. ’Afrin has around 20,000 inhabitants. 
5. From 1999 until 2001 I lived in Aleppo doing ethnographic research among the Sufi
zawiyas in the city and in the Kurd Dagh. I also did several other periods of fieldwork
research in Aleppo and the Kurd Dagh until 2010.
6. The  Kurds  of  Syria  are  all  Sunni  Muslims,  with  the  exception  of  the  Yezidi
community,  which has approximately 20,000 members in the Jabal  Sinjar,  the Kurd
Dagh and Aleppo [Pinto 2007; Tejel Gorgas 2009].
7. The presence of the Rifa’iyya in the Kurd Dagh is documented since the beginning of
the 20th Century [Lescot 1988]. 
Kurdish Sufi Spaces of Rural-Urban. Connection in Northern Syria
Études rurales, 186 | 2010
16
8. This process, as I could reconstruct it from interviews with the sheikh al-masha’ikh of
the Qadiriyya in Aleppo, happened simultaneously to the centralization of Sufi orders
for administrative purposes of the Ottoman state [de Jong 1986; Luizard 1996].
9. It is interesting to notice that the Naqshbandiyya Kuftariyya has had a very limited
success in Aleppo, despite the fact that its late leader, Sheikh Ahmad Kaftaru, was the
mufti  of  Syria and a Kurd [Bottcher 1998].  The close connections between this  Sufi
order and the state seems to explain its lack of appeal in a city traditionally opposed to
the Ba’th regime, such as Aleppo. 
10. Sheikh Muhammad had good relations with the Ba’thist  regime.  However,  after
meeting  with  the  leader  in  exile  of  the  Syrian Muslim Brothers  in  Europe,  he  was
kidnapped and murdered.  His  death, in which many saw the dealings of  the secret
services (mukhabarat) triggered a cycle of revolts and state repression in the Kurdish
majority areas of northern Syria [Tejel Gorgas 2009]. 
11. Many informants told me that Nabi Huri was Uriah from the Old Testament. It is
important  to  note  that  Uriah  is  not  a  prophet  in  Judaism  and,  therefore,  is  not
recognized as such by the mainstream Islamic tradition [Fartacek 2002]. This example
shows  the  multiple  articulations  between  local  religious  practices  and  the  Islamic
tradition that serve as basis  for the cultural  and intellectual  elaboration of  what is
defined by many Kurdish Sufi sheikhs and their disciples as “Kurdish Islam”. 
12. Religious  nationalism is  a  form of  imagining the nation as  a  moral community
defined by religious affiliation. See B. Anderson [1991] and P. van der Veer [1994].
13. Sheikh Mahmud died on May 2000, being succeeded by his elder son as the head of
the zawiya.
14. In  this  analysis  I  differentiate  between “followers”,  who I  define  as  those  who
participate regularly in the religious community organized in a Sufi zawiya but are not
passing through the process of initiation in the mystical path, and “disciples”, who are
those who are passing through the process of initiation in the mystical path. 
15. It is important to notice that the claim of descent from al-Rifa’i through a grandson
is an ingenious strategy to avoid the fact that al-Rifa’i had no living male descendents
[al-Samara’i s.d.]. 
16. After the death of Sheikh Mahmud in 2000, Husayn became the new sheikh of the
zawiya in  ’Afrin.  His  move  to ’Afrin  unleashed  a  crisis  in  the  whole  religious  and
economic system of the zawiya. His absence from Aleppo left the economic networks
without a centralized organization. In the other hand, his lack of charisma and absence
of ritual skills created a major religious crisis,  with many members abandoning the
community.  While  the  crisis  started  to  be  overcome  after  2003,  the  remaining
community was very much weakened and the economic networks much less organized
and effective. 
17. Sheikh Hassan died in 2005. The links between his zawiya and Sheikh Muhiy al-Din’s
community, although weakened, remain until today.
18. Kurdish dialect spoken in Syria, Turkey and Iraq.
19. Jocelyne Cornand showed how Islamic practices and values are used to create bonds
of solidarity among employers and workers in the textile industries in Aleppo [1994].
20. This partnership still existed in 2006, when I visited again the zawiya.
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Les communautés kurdes soufies fonctionnent comme des espaces de médiation entre les univers
urbain et rural du nord de la Syrie, permettant la circulation des personnes, des biens et des
idées à travers leurs réseaux religieux. Cet article montre comment deux communautés soufies,
l’une à Alep, principale ville du nord de la Syrie, l’autre à ’Afrin, ville située dans une zone rurale
au nord d’Alep, organisent, dans cette région, des formes de connection discrètes entre la ville et
la campagne. Tandis que la communauté d’’Afrin mobilise ses réseaux religieux pour se rattacher
à l’univers  économique et  culturel  d’Alep,  celle  d’Alep fournit  à  ses  membres des  références
culturelles pour leur permettre de passer facilement du contexte urbain-arabe au contexte rural-
kurde. Par conséquent,  les communautés soufies sont des espaces de circulation culturelle et
sociale qui estompent les frontières entre l’urbain et le rural dans le nord de la Syrie.
Sufi communities function as spaces of mediation between the urban and rural universes among
the Kurds of Northern Syria, allowing the circulation of people, goods and ideas through their
religious networks. This article analyzes how two Sufi communities, one located in Aleppo, the
main urban center of northern Syria; and the other located in ’Afrin, a Kurdish town in a rural
area north of Aleppo, create discrete forms of connection between city and countryside in this
region.  While  the  community  in  ’Afrin  mobilizes  religious  networks  in  order  to  connect  the
community  with  the  economic  and  cultural  universe  of  Aleppo,  the  one  in  Aleppo  provides
cultural  references  to  their  members  that  enable  them to  navigate  in  both  Arab  urban and
Kurdish  rural  contexts.  Therefore,  the  Sufi  communities  are  spaces  of  cultural  and  social
circulation that blur the boundaries between urban and rural in northern Syria.
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